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We compare alternating-oﬀer and demand bargaining models of the legisla-
tive bargaining process. These two approaches make very diﬀerent predictions
in terms of both ex-ante and ex-post distribution of payoﬀs, as well as about the
role of the order of play. Experiments show that actual bargaining behavior is
not as sensitive to the diﬀerent bargaining rules as the theoretical predictions.
We compare our results to studies attempting to distinguish between these two
approaches using ￿eld data. We ￿nd strong similarities between the experi-
mental data and the ￿eld data regardless of whether the experiments employ
alternating-oﬀer or demand-bargaining protocols. This behavioral identi￿cation
problem suggests that it is impossible to derive, just from payoﬀ data, what
bargaining rules are being used in coalitional bargaining outside the laboratory.
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11 Introduction
Most group decisions require the consent of the majority of group members. When
t h ei s s u ei sh o wt od i v i d ea￿xed amount of resources among the group members,
t h ec o r eo ft h eg a m ei se m p t y ,s i n c ew ec a na l w a y s￿nd a majority of group members
who would object to any given distributive proposal on the table. When the core is
empty, voting and bargaining theories focus on the diﬀerent predictions that could
derive from the diﬀerent ￿institutional￿ rules observed in reality (positive approach)
or conceivable (normative approach) for such bargaining situations. These issues
are especially relevant in distributive politics (e.g., committee and congressional
decisions about pork barrel projects) and government formation in parliamentary
democracies, but are also important problems in corporations. An additional com-
plication, especially in government formation bargaining problems and in corporate
governance, is the potential heterogeneity of bargaining power across group mem-
bers. A strand of the cooperative game theory literature has focused on weighted
majority games, and more recently there have been various attempts to study such
games with noncooperative bargaining models. The theoretical predictions of these
noncooperative bargaining models are very sensitive to variations in the rules of
the game, and the equilibrium solution(s) may well require an unrealistic degree of
rationality on the part of agents. Hence one wonders whether the actual behavior
of bargaining agents is as sensitive to changing the rules of the game as the theory
predicts. We report an experiment analyzing two very diﬀerent kinds of bargaining
games advocated in the literature, which can shed some light on these issues.
The classic Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model of how two agents can agree
to split a dollar can be interpreted in two equivalent ways: the ￿rst mover can be
either thought of as making an oﬀer to the other agent, or as making a demand
of a share, leaving to the other agent the choice between accepting the residual
or disagreeing. In both cases the decision of the second mover depends on the
discount factor, on whether the repeated game is ￿nite or in￿nitely repeated, and on
other institutional features, but not on the interpretation of whether the proposal
was a demand or an oﬀer. However, as soon as there is a group with at least
three members, as in legislative or committee bargaining, oﬀers and demands are
no longer equivalent. If the proposer is making a speci￿c distributive oﬀer, the
other players￿ decision is basically a voting decision on the speci￿co ﬀer; on the
other hand, if the ￿rst mover is only making her own demand on the total amount
of resources, the subsequent movers have also to decide what demand to make,
2and hence the asymmetry between movers is reduced. In reality, one can think
of situations where the oﬀer interpretation of the bargaining process seems more
appropriate, and of situations where the opposite is true.1 Although most real world
bargaining processes are much less structured and richer than both of these extreme
theoretical idealizations, there have been a number of empirical studies employing
￿eld data which make comparisons between them (Warwick and Druckman, 2001;
Ansolabehere et al., 2003). The present paper is the ￿rst experimental work on this
topic.
The alternating-oﬀer model of majoritarian bargaining most used in political
economy literature is Baron and Ferejohn (1989). In its closed-rule in￿nitely-
repeated form, someone is picked at random to make a proposal, then the others
simultaneously vote yes or no. If the majority rejects the proposal then a new
proposer is chosen at random with the process repeating until an allocation is de-
termined (with or without discounting, and with various types of randomization
protocols). If the probability of recognition for each group member after any rejec-
tion is proportional to her relative bargaining power, then the ex-ante distribution
of expected payoﬀs is proportional to the distribution of bargaining power, and co-
incides with the nucleolus of the game (see Montero, 2001). However, the ex-post
distribution of equilibrium payoﬀs, by which we mean the equilibrium distribution
of payoﬀsa f t e ra￿rst proposer has been picked by nature, displays a very high
proposer advantage.2
On the opposite extreme ￿demand￿ side of the spectrum of bargaining mod-
els, players sequentially make demands, and after each demand the next mover is
randomly selected among those who have not yet made a demand, again with pro-
portional recognition probability. This process continues until every player has made
a demand or until some player has closed a majority coalition by demanding the
residual part of the cake, the rest of which was demanded by the previous movers
in the majority coalition. If no majority coalition with a feasible set of demands
1When the relevant players are committee members or individual congressmen, it is often the
case that at some point (perhaps after a long discussion) someone makes a complete proposal and
the others simply vote yes or no. On the other hand, when the relevant players are party leaders, like
in the government formation process in European parliamentary systems, the formateur always has
multiple consultations with the other party leaders about their individual demands for ministerial
payoﬀs, and the ￿nal proposal is only a formal step, with the agreement being already reached at
the demand stage.
2The fact that the agenda setter￿s power predicted by the Baron-Ferejohn￿s model is perhaps
excessive was ￿rst discussed in Harrington (1990).
3emerges after all players have made a demand, a new ￿rst demander is randomly
selected, all the previous demands are void, and the game proceeds (with or with-
out discounting) until a compatible set of demands is made by a majority coalition.
This model makes a unique prediction for homogeneous weighted majority games
￿ a prediction of proportionality between the relative payoﬀ shares in the majority
coalition and their relative ￿real￿ voting weights ￿ which corresponds to the unique
solution in the Demand Bargaining Set (see Morelli and Montero, 2003).3, 4 That
is, unlike the Baron and Ferejohn game, the ex-post distribution of payoﬀsw i t h i n
the majority coalition is always proportional to the relative bargaining power among
the members of the majority coalition itself, without any ￿rst mover advantage.
The experiments reported here test for the internal validity of the demand bar-
gaining and Baron-Ferejohn models both in terms of their point predictions and
their comparative static predictions. All games involve bargaining groups of ￿ve
subjects, a majority rule, and no shrinking of the pie over time. We address the
c o m p a r a t i v es t a t i cp r e d i c t i o n so ft h et w om o d e l sb y￿rst comparing a game in which
all players have equal voting power (the Equal Weight game) to one in which one
player controls three votes while four others control one vote each (the Apex game).
We ￿nd that there are important behavioral regularities across games, which make
them much more similar in outcomes than predicted by theory. For both bargaining
game forms one-vote players receive a small extra bene￿t from moving ￿rst (forma-
teur power) whereas the ex-post share to an Apex formateur is typically at (or even
below) the demand bargaining prediction. To verify that such a lack of formateur
power for Apex player derives from an ￿equity consideration￿ eﬀect, we add a third
treatment, where the only change is that the Apex subject takes home only 1/3 of
the share obtained by the Apex player in the game. The two types of Apex treat-
ments have exactly the same theoretical predictions for all bargaining rules, but the
experimental results display a substantial equity correction eﬀect, so that the Apex
player in the third treatment exhibits some formateur power.
3The demand bargaining set is a selection of the Zhou bargaining set characterized by the
requirement that counter-objections are acceptable only if they use the same demand vector of the
original allocation proposal. The reason for this requirement is that any allocation proposal can
always be represented by a pair, a demand vector and a coalition structure; a necessary condition
for a vector of demands, one for each player, to be ￿stable￿ is that any objection to the proposal
can be countered by another coalition that still refers to the original demand vector.
4The ￿rst attempts of a noncooperative demand bargaining approach can be found in Selten
(1992), Winter (1994a, 1994b) and Morelli (1999).
4The question of external validity is addressed by running regressions similar to
those performed with ￿eld data and comparing the experimental results to the ￿eld
data. There are a number of remarkable similarities between the experiments and
the ￿eld data, regardless of whether the data underlying the regressions is for the
demand bargaining or the Baron-Ferejohn game. Further, it is impossible, when
looking at the experimental data, to clearly distinguish between the two games
using the criteria commonly employed with the ￿eld data. Given the behavioral
similarities that emerge in the lab between bargaining protocols, and the similari-
ties between the lab and ￿eld data, the implication is that in the ￿eld data it will
be impossible to distinguish between the two bargaining models solely on the basis
of payoﬀ data. This behavioral identi￿cation problem can be simply explained as
follows: Even though the speci￿cations used in the empirical studies are well iden-
ti￿ed with respect to the behavior implied by the theory, the parameters of interest
are not identi￿ed with respect to the behavior actually observed. To address this
behavioral identi￿cation problem, one would need to observe the actual institutional
structure of the underlying game, not just the behavioral outcomes.
As already noted, prior research comparing the demand bargaining approach to
the Baron-Ferejohn approach to legislative bargaining has been limited to ￿eld data:
analyzing power in coalition governments (portfolios a party holds) in relation to
the number of votes a party controls (seats in parliament). Warwick and Druck-
man (2001), following up on the earlier work of Browne and Franklin (1973) and
Browne and Frendreis (1980), ￿nd a proportional relationship between portfolios
held and the share of votes contributed to the winning coalition for most speci￿-
cations.5 However, Ansolabehere et al. (2003) analyze a similar data set and ￿nd
evidence of proposer power (which supports the predictions of the Baron-Ferejohn
model) even without controlling for portfolio salience. The main diﬀerence in ap-
proach is that Ansolabehere et al. use voting weights rather than seat shares as
the independent variable.6 There have been numerous other studies investigating
5Warwick and Druckman (2001) improve on the methodology of Browne and Franklin (1973)
and Browne and Frendreis (1980) by controlling for the importance of the portfolios each party
receives. They obviously ￿nd formateur power as soon as one attributes a large enough power
weight to the prime minister seat, and they later verify (Warwick and Druckman 2003) that the
diﬀerence between the power of the prime minister and that of any other minister in reality is as
large as that needed to obtain a formateur advantage in the regressions.
6That is, they use real as opposed to nominal bargaining power (see Frechette, Kagel, and
Morelli, 2003). Their data set also includes a few more years and two additional countries compared
to Warwick and Druckman (2001).
5the many implications of the Baron-Ferejohn model using ￿eld data, but with no
comparisons to the demand bargaining approach, nor with any clear benchmark as
to what the Baron-Ferejohn model predicts.7
Experimental studies of the Baron-Ferejohn model have been quite limited (McK-
elvey, 1991; Frechette, Kagel and Lehrer, 2003; Diermier and Morton, 2000; Frechette,
Kagel and Morelli, 2003), with all of them focusing on games in which agents have
equal real voting weights. Thus, the present paper is the ￿rst to directly compare the
Baron-Ferejohn and demand bargaining approaches within an experimental frame-
w o r k ,a sw e l la st h e￿rst to investigate the Apex game within the Baron-Ferejohn
framework. There have, of course, been several earlier experimental studies of the
Apex game within the framework of cooperative game theory (see, for example,
Selten and Schuster, 1968 and Horowitz and Rapoport, 1974). We compare our
experimental results to these earlier studies in the concluding section of the paper.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the theoretical implications
of the demand bargaining and Baron-Ferejohn models for the games implemented
in the laboratory. Section 3 characterizes the experimental design and procedures.
The experimental results are reported in Section 4. Section 5 compares regressions
based on the experimental results to compatible regressions using ￿eld data. Section
6 summarizes our main ￿ndings and relates the results to earlier studies of the Apex
game and to ￿fairness￿ issues derived from the experimental literature on bilateral
bargaining games in economics.
2A l t e r n a t e O ﬀers vs. Demand Bargaining: Theoretical
Predictions
The alternating-oﬀer model uses the closed-rule in￿nitely repeated bargaining model
of Baron and Ferejohn (henceforth BF);8 The demand bargaining model (hereafter
7For example, data from US legislative districts shows a positive association between the level of
federal government spending in a district and the districts represented on the committee responsible
for the expenditures in question (Ferejohn, 1974, Atlas et al, 1995, Knight, 2002). However, this is
a far cry from strict support for the theory which commonly calls for a highly uneven distribution
of ex-post bene￿ts between proposers and coalition members, for which the investigator typically
has no well de￿ned reference point.
8Frechette, Kagel and Lehrer (2003) also study the open-rule model. Here the focus is on the
closed-rule model because it is the one that has been compared with demand bargaining on ￿eld
data, and because the closed rule provides a more radical benchmark in terms of the ex post
6DB) uses a slight modi￿cation of Morelli (1999).9 The two models are presented
in turn, displaying the speci￿c predictions for the simple games on which we do
experiments. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2.1 The Baron-Ferejohn model
Let n be an odd number of agents, n = 5 in the experiments. In the Equal Weight
game, where each agent has one vote, at least three players have to agree on how to
split a ￿xed amount of resources (money). One player is selected at random to make
a proposal on how to divide the money, with this proposal voted up or down with
no room for amendment. If a majority votes in favor of the proposed distribution,
then the proposal is binding. If the proposal fails then a new proposer is picked
at random, and the process repeats itself until a proposal is passed. Thus, at the
proposal and voting stage each agent has to keep in mind that if the proposal doesn￿t
pass they will be recognized as the proposer in the next stage with probability 1/n.
In our implementation the cake does not shrink if the proposal does not pass so
that 1/n is also the continuation expected equilibrium payoﬀ after a rejection. The
unique Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SSPE) outcome gives 3/5 of the
money to the proposer and 1/5 to each of two other agents who were proposed their
reservation continuation payoﬀ, and the proposal is accepted. The remaining two
agents receive zero of course.
Consider now what happens if four of the players have one vote but the ￿fth
player (called the Apex player) has three votes. This is a game with heterogeneous
bargaining power, since the Apex player only needs one other player to form a mini-
mal winning coalition. Assume that the recognition probability is proportional, i.e.,
that after any rejected proposal the Apex player is recognized as the new proposer
with probability 3/7, and every other player with probability 1/7.10 In this game the
SSPE prediction is as follows: if the ￿rst mover is the Apex player, then a minimum
winning coalition (MWC) with two players forms, and the Apex receives 6/7 of the
cake; if the ￿rst mover is not the Apex player, then the ￿rst mover receives 4/7, and
the residual goes to the Apex with probability 1/4 and is divided equally among the
distribution of bene￿ts than the open rule.
9The modi￿ed model is easier to implement in the lab, but has similar equilibrium predictions
to the original one.
10This proportional recognition probability assumption is not crucial for the special games studied
in this paper (see Montero, 2002). However, the proportional recognition probability assumption
is the only one consistent with ex-ante proportional payoﬀs in general (see Montero, 2001).
7three one-vote players (henceforth called ￿base￿ players) with probability 3/4. In
other words, each of the base players, when proposing, invites the Apex player into
the coalition with probability 1/4 and forms a four-person coalition with the other
base players with probability 3/4. Hence, the predicted frequency with which the
Apex player appears in an equilibrium MWC is 4
7. 11
2.2 The Demand Bargaining model
Rather than assuming that the ￿rst mover makes a proposal to be voted up or down,
in the DB approach the ￿rst mover, who is chosen randomly, makes a demand of a
share of the ￿xed amount of resources.12 Next, a second mover is selected randomly
from the other four, and makes a second demand. If the ￿rst two movers can
constitute a MWC and their demands do not exceed the total amount of resources,
then the two players will establish a majority coalition, and the next randomized
mover(s) can only demand the residual resources, if any. If the ￿rst two movers do
not have enough votes to constitute a MWC and/or the ￿rst two demands exceed
the ￿x e da m o u n to fr e s o u r c e s ,t h e nat h i r dm over is selected (randomly among the
remaining three players) and makes a third demand. The game may not reach the
￿fth mover, because as soon as a subset of the players that constitute a majority
coalition have made compatible demands exhausting the money, the game ends.
But if, after all players have moved once, no set of compatible demands exists in
any potential majority coalition, then all demands are voided and the game starts
again. The game can go on inde￿nitely, like the BF game.13 We assume, consistent
with the assumptions made in the BF model, that the probability of recognition is
always proportional to the relative weight of the players who do not yet have a valid
(i.e., not voided) demand on the bargaining table.
For the Equal Weight game the unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) out-
11With this probability mixture when the small player is indiﬀerent, the continuation payoﬀ of
the Apex player is indeed
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4 i st h eu n i q u es y m m e t r i c
equilibrium, guaranteeing that 3
7 and 1
7 are the respective continuation payoﬀs for Apex and base
players respectively. Of course there could also be asymmetric equilibrium mixtures, but all with
t h es a m ep r o p e r t i e si nt e r m so fe x - a n t ep a y o ﬀ predictions and frequencies of coalitions. Thus,
asymmetric equilibria are ignored here.
12Here think of a party leader who says what her party would want in order to participate in a
government coalition, but does not propose what the other potential coalition members get.
13It is possible to show that the equilibrium outcome of the DB model does not depend on
whether the game is ￿nite or not, nor does it depend on the discount factor (see Morelli,1999, for
this point).
8come of the DB model gives 1/3 of the cake to each of the ￿rst three movers who
form a MWC. In the Apex game the unique SPE gives the Apex player 3/4 unless
she moves last, and gives a base player 1/4 when she ends up in the MWC with the
Apex player. If the Apex player moves last, the MWC is made up of all base players
each receiving 1/4 of the money.14 Since the Apex player is in the MWC unless
she moves last, the frequency with which the Apex player belongs to the MWC is







4). Hence the ex-ante payoﬀ for the Apex player is almost
73% of the money (and the ex-ante payoﬀ for a base player is slightly more than
1
16).
2.3 Diﬀerences and similarities
The BF and DB models have a number of factors in common as well as a number
of major diﬀerences. For both models, subgame perfection predicts that money
will be allocated in the ￿rst stage, only MWCs will be formed (with non-coalition
members receiving zero payoﬀs), and the Apex player will receive substantially larger
shares than the base players, or than players shares in the Equal Weight game. The
diﬀerences concern the distribution of ex-ante and ex-post payoﬀs, as well as the
likelihood of observing one or the other type of MWC:
￿ Ex-post:T h e￿rst mover always has a strong favorable position in the BF
model. This makes the ex-post predictions of the BF model far from propor-
tional, whereas the ex-post payoﬀ distribution using the DB model is always
proportional to the relative weights in the MWC that is formed. Thus, when
all players have equal voting power, the ex-post payoﬀ for the proposer is 60%
of the pie in the BF model versus 33.3% for the ￿rst (and all other) movers in
the DB game. In the Apex games, when the Apex player is the ￿rst mover,
her predicted payoﬀ is 85.7% in the BF game compared to 75% in the DB
game. Further, conditional on being included as a member of the winning
coalition, the share for the Apex player drops to 42.9% when the base player
is the proposer in the BF game, whereas the Apex player￿s share remains ￿xed
at 75% any time she is included in the winning coalition in the DB game.
￿ Ex-ante: I nt h eB Fg a m et h ee x - a n t ep a y o ﬀ for the Apex player is 3/7,
14More precisely, a base player receives 1/4 if one of the following four events occur: (1) she is
￿rst, (2) she is second after the Apex, (3) she moves right before the Apex, and (4) when the Apex
moves last. Otherwise she receives 0. See the appendix.
9Base Formateur Partner Apex Formateur Partner
Equal Weight
BF 0.6 0.2 NA NA
DB 0.333 0.333 NA NA
Apex
BF 0.571 0.429 a 0.857 0.143
DB 0.25 0.75 a 0.75 0.25
a Share for an Apex partner. To be divided in three
equal parts in the case of all base players.
Table 1: Predicted Shares
which coincides with the continuation payoﬀ after a proposal is rejected; on
the other hand, in the DB game the Apex player is ex-ante almost sure to
receive 3/4 of the money, so that her expected payoﬀ is almost 73% of the
money. Correspondingly, the ex-ante payoﬀ for the small players is 1/7 in the
B Fg a m ea n dl e s st h a nh a l ft h a nt h a ti nt h eD Bg a m e .
￿ Finally the Apex player is predicted to be a member of the minimal winning
c o a l i t i o ns u b s t a n t i a l l ym o r eo f t e ni nt h eD Bg a m et h a ni nt h eB Fg a m e( 9 7 %
vs. 57%, given the proportional recognition probabilities employed).
Table 1 summarizes the predictions of the two models. Regarding allocation of
shares, the emphasis in the analysis is on the ex post distribution, in part because of
the ￿eld data we will compare our results to, and in part because these predictions
are more extreme and less easily satis￿ed than the ex ante distribution of payoﬀs.
3 Experimental Design
In each bargaining round ￿ve subjects divided $60 between ￿ve voting blocks, with
one subject representing each voting block. Our initial experimental design em-
ployed two treatment conditions for each of the DB and BF games: the Equal
Weight game and the Apex game. After seeing the results from these two treat-
ments, a third treatment was implemented, referred to as the Apex1/3 treatment
in which the Apex player receives 1/3 of the Apex player￿s payoﬀ rather than the
full payment. The motivation for this treatment will become clear in the process of
10Treatment Experience Number of Subjects
Level BF DB
Control Inexperienced 30 30
Experienced 15 15
Apex Inexperienced 30 30
Experienced 15 10
Table 2: Number of Subjects per Treatment
reporting the results for the two initial treatments, and will be discussed in detail
at the appropriate point in the text.
Either 10 or 15 subjects were recruited for each experimental session, so that
there would be either 2 or 3 bargaining rounds conducted simultaneously in each
session. In the Apex sessions subjects weights, which were selected randomly during
the dry run, remained ￿xed throughout the experimental session.15 Subjects were
assigned to each ￿legislative￿ cohort randomly in each bargaining round, subject to
the restriction that in the Apex sessions each voting block contained a single Apex
player. Subject numbers also changed randomly between bargaining rounds (but
not between the various stages of a given bargaining round). Feedback from voting
outcomes was limited to the legislative cohort a subject was assigned to.
In the BF treatments, the procedures of each bargaining round were as follows:
First all subjects entered a proposal allocating the $60. Then one proposal was ran-
domly selected to be the standing proposal. This proposal was posted on subjects￿
screens giving the amounts allocated to each voting block, by subject number, along
with the number of votes controlled by that subject. Proposals were voted up or
down, with no opportunity for amendment. If a simple majority accepted the pro-
posal the payoﬀ was implemented and the bargaining round ended. If the proposal
was rejected, the process repeated itself. Complete voting results were posted on
subjects￿ screens, giving the amount allocated by subject number (along with the
number of votes that subject controlled in the Apex games), whether that subject
voted for or against the proposal, and whether the proposal passed or not.16 Recog-
15There is an obvious tradeoﬀ here between having a larger sample of subjects in the role of
the Apex player versus the possible eﬀect of changing roles on speed of adjustment to equilibrium
play and/or possible reciprocity considerations. This is an important technical issue that should
be explored as part of any continuing research in this area.
16Screens also displayed the proposed shares and votes for the last three bargaining rounds as
11nition probabilities for proposals to be voted on equaled the ratio of the number of
votes controlled to the total number of votes.
In the DB sessions procedures were as follows: First, all subjects entered a de-
mand for their desired share of the $60. Then one demand was randomly selected
to represent the ￿rst demand and was posted on all subjects￿ screens. This process
repeated itself up to the point that a player could close the bargaining round with-
out violating the budget constraint. At that point the player who could close the
bargaining round was given the option to close it or to continue the process. In those
cases where the player closing the bargaining round could include diﬀerent subsets
of players in the coalition, there was an option as to who to include. Further, in
case a bargaining round was closed without exhausting the budget constraint, and
there were still players whose demands had yet to be recognized, these players were
permitted to make demands on the residual.17 In case all players had made their
demands without anyone closing, the process repeated itself. If a player closed the
bargaining round, the ￿nal allocation was binding. The complete set of demands for
each stage of a bargaining round were posted on subjects screens, giving the amount
demanded by subject number. Once a bargaining round closed, screens reported the
demands of those included in the winning coalition. In the Apex games the number
of votes each subject controlled was reported, along with these demands. The order
in which subjects were called on to make their demands was determined by the ratio
of number of votes controlled to the total number of votes for those players who had
yet to be selected.
Subjects were recruited through e-mail solicitations and posters spread around
the Ohio State University campus. For each treatment, there were two inexperienced
subject sessions and one experienced subject session. Experienced subjects all had
prior experience with exactly the same treatment they were recruited back for.18 A
total of 11 bargaining rounds were held in each inexperienced subject session, 1 dry
run and 10 for cash, with one of the cash bargaining rounds selected at random to
well as the proposed shares and votes for up to the past three stages of the current bargaining
round. Other general information such as the number of votes required for a proposal to be
accepted were also displayed. Screen shots, along with instructions, are provided at the web site
http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/kagel/Apexinstructions1.pdf.
17These residual demands were recognized in random order. If the ￿rst of these demands did not
exhaust the budget constraint, the process was repeated until the residual was exhausted and/or
all demands were satis￿ed. Any demand exceeding the residual was counted as a zero demand.
18All subjects were invited back for experienced subject sessions. In case more than 15 subjects
showed up for a session, subjects to be sent home were randomly determined.
12Frequency bargaining ends in stage 1 Frequency of MWC
Equal Weight BF DB BF DB
Inexperienced 61.7% (1.7) [5] 96.7% (1.0) [2] 76.6% 82.5%
Experienced 50.0% (1.6) [3] 96.7% (1.0) [1] 94.2% 87.6%
Apex
Inexperienced 57.9% (1.9) [12] 93.3% (1.1) [2] 63.1% 77.3%
Experienced 76.7% (1.4) [7] 95.0% (1.1) [2] 73.4% 100.0%
Table 3: Frequency of bargaining rounds that end in stage 1 and of minimum winning
coalitions. Average [maximum] number of stages in parenthesis [square bracquets]
be paid oﬀ on.19 In addition, each subject received a participation fee of $8.
4 Experimental Results
Results will be presented as a series of conclusions. The conclusions that concern
exclusively the ￿nal allocations will have FA in parenthesis at the beginning. Other-
wise, the analysis will be based on all observations, including proposals and demands
that were rejected and that failed to be recognized. If a conclusion is limited to min-
imal winning coalitions, it will have MWC in parentheses. As a convention, the term
formateur will be used to refer to the proposer in the BF treatments and the subject
who made the ￿r s td e m a n di nt h e￿nal allocation in the DB treatments.
4.1 Demands and Proposals in the Equal Weight and Apex Treat-
ments
The ￿rst two columns of Table 3 show the frequency with which bargaining rounds
end in stage 1. The average number of stages per bargaining round are shown in
parentheses next to these percentages, and the maximum number in brackets next
to this. A majority of bargaining rounds end in stage 1 for both BF and DB, but
this happens much more frequently under DB. However, what is missing from these
19The dry run was eliminated in the experienced subject sessions. Inexperienced subject sessions
lasted approximately 1.5 hours; experienced subject sessions approximately 1 hour as summary
instructions were employed and subjects were familiar with the task. Although each bargaining
round could potentially last very (in￿nitely) long, there was never any need for the experimenter to
intervene to insure completing a session well within the time frame (up to 2 hours) subjects were
recruited for.
13statistics is that for DB, within a bargaining round, it often required more than the
minimal number of steps (demands) to achieve an allocation. For example, in the
Equal Weight treatment, 45.0% (33.4%) of all bargaining rounds required more than
three steps to close for inexperienced (experienced) subjects.20 The typical reason
for these extra steps is that one of the early players demanded too much, so that
player was passed over (and received a zero share as a consequence). In the Equal
Weight treatment, for example, with inexperienced subjects, the average demand
for subjects excluded from the ￿nal allocation when four steps were necessary was a
0.542 share, compared to an average share of 0.292 for those included in the winning
coalition.21
Conclusion 1 Over 50.0% of all allocations were completed in stage 1 for both
BF and DB, with substantially more allocations completed in stage 1 under the DB
game. However, far from all of the DB bargaining rounds ended in the minimal
number of steps, contrary to the theory￿s prediction.
The last two columns of Table 3 report the frequency of MWCs across treat-
ments. These percentages are consistently well above the 50% mark, and tend to
be somewhat higher under DB than under BF. At the other extreme very few bar-
gaining rounds end with everyone getting a share of the pie. Non-MWCs in the
DB treatments consist almost exclusively of cases where a subject closed the bar-
gaining round but left money over for later movers. In the Equal Weight version of
the DB game the amount of money left over in these cases averaged $8.15 ($7.27)
per bargaining round for inexperienced (experienced) subjects. By way of contrast,
non-MWCs in the BF game left over an average of $13.85 ($12.07) per bargaining
round for the redundant coalition partners (de￿ned as those excess players receiving
the lowest shares).
Conclusion 2 The majority of proposals were for MWCs with somewhat higher
frequencies of MWCs in DB than in BF.
20Of those requiring more than three steps, 26.7% (26.7%) were achieved in four steps, with
the remaining 18.3% (6.7%) requiring ￿ve steps for inexperienced (experienced) subjects. The
number of bargaining rounds ending in the minimal number of steps was a little higher in the Apex
treatments, with 28.3% (20.0%) of the bargaining rounds requiring more than the minimal number
of steps for inexperienced (experienced) subjects.
21Shares for those included are less than 1/3 due to those elections providing bene￿ts to more
than a MWC. For bargaining rounds lasting ￿ve steps the corresponding shares were 0.457 for
those excluded versus 0.330 for those included.
14Baron-Ferejohn
Equal Weight 1 Vote Formateur Partner Apex Formateur Partner
Inexperienced 0.399 [.600] 0.305b [.200]
Experienced 0.402 [.600] 0.299b [.200]
Apex ￿ Inexperienced.
Apex Included 0.469 [.571] 0.530a [.429] 0.721 [.857] 0.279 [.143]
Apex Excluded 0.319 [.571] 0.236b [.143]
Apex ￿ Experienced
Apex Included 0.519 [.571] 0.481a [.429] 0.667 [.857] 0.333 [.143]
Apex Excluded 0.333 [.571] 0.222b [.143]
a. Apex payoﬀ.
b. Highest share among coalition partners when all base players.
Table 4: Allocations passed for Minimum Winning Coalitions [predicted values in
brackets]
Demand Bargaining
Equal Weight 1 Vote Formateur Partner Apex Formateur Partner
Inexperienced 0.337 [.333] 0.364b [.333]
Experienced 0.346 [.333] 0.348b [.333]
Apex
Inexperienced 0.358 [.250] 0.642a [.750] 0.636 [.750] 0.364 [.250]
Experienced 0.350 [.250] 0.650a [.750] 0.811 [.750] 0.189 [.250]
a. Apex payoﬀ.
b. Highest share among coalition partners when all base players.
Table 5: Allocations passed for Minimum Winning Coalitions [predicted values in
brackets]
15One of the key diﬀerences between the DB and BF models relates to the ex
post distribution of bene￿ts within MWCs. This is also the key factor used to
distinguish between the two models with ￿eld data. Tables 4 and 5 report shares
to coalition partners for accepted MWCs. Predicted shares are reported in brackets
next to average realized shares. The tables distinguish between coalitions in which
the formateur is a base player and those with an Apex formateur. Further, for the
BF sessions we distinguish between MWCs involving the Apex player and those with
base players only. (For DB sessions there are no MWCs involving all base players.)
For coalitions with all base players, partner￿s share reports the average of the largest
share allocated to any coalition partner.
There are a number of clear patterns in the data:
1. About base players:
(a) In the BF sessions base players have clear proposer power: In all cases
their shares are above the number of votes they bring to the MWC.
However, with the exception of base formateurs who form a coalition
with the Apex player, they never achieve anything close to the extreme
proposer power the BF model predicts.
(b) In the DB sessions, base players have a ￿rst-mover advantage, as they
consistently average more than their predicted share when going ￿rst.
(c) The ￿rst-mover advantage is consistently greater for base players in BF
than in DB games, as the theory predicts. However, the diﬀerences are
not nearly as large as the theory predicts.
2. About the Apex player:
(a) In the BF games, Apex players lack proposer power as their average
shares are below 0.750 for both inexperienced and experienced players.
(b) Inexperienced Apex players in DB games obtain average shares below
the predicted level, although experienced players do a bit better than
predicted.
(c) Thus, Apex players obtain similar shares when they are ￿rst movers under
the two bargaining protocols. And these shares are much closer to those
predicted under DB.
163. About frequencies:
(a) In BF games base players earn substantially more as formateurs when
partnering with the Apex player than when partnering with other base
players (increased shares of 31% and 60% for inexperienced and experi-
enced players respectively). Hence, not surprisingly, base players form
MWCs with Apex players 70.4% (73.5%) of the time for inexperienced
(experienced) players, compared to the predicted rate of 25%.
(b) In DB games base players partner with Apex players 100% of the time in
MWCs, which is not unexpected given the recognition protocol employed.
Indeed, there were only 4 bargaining rounds (for inexperienced subjects
and none for experienced subjects) where the Apex player had not been
s e l e c t e db yt h ef o u r t hs t e pi nt h ed e m a n dp r o c e s s ,a n di na l lo ft h e s e
cases the fourth base player failed to close the coalition, either because
they could not do so and stay within the budget constraint or because
the residual share was too small to be acceptable.
Conclusion 3 (FA, MWC) Base formateurs have a clear ￿rst-mover advantage in
both BF and DB games. Further, although these base formateurs did not take nearly
as much as predicted in the BF games, they had a stronger ￿rst-mover advantage
under BF compared to DB, as the theory predicts. In contrast, Apex formateurs had
little (if any) proposer power in both BF and DB treatments. In general, with respect
to formateur power, behavior is much more similar between BF and DB games than
the theory predicts.
Two remarks are in order here: First, the proposer power in the DB game for base
players could result from a number of factors. For example, in the Equal Weight
game, one can imagine that later movers would be willing to accept a somewhat
smaller share than predicted out of fear of being shut out of the winning coalition
and willingness to pay a small price to guard against this. The latter, in turn could
result from (1) risk aversion, which is not analyzed in the theory, (2) players own
inability to follow the backward induction argument underlying the SPE, or (3) lack
of con￿dence in others being able to follow the logic underlying the SPE. Regardless
of the basis for the behavior, from the shares reported in Table 5, it is clear that
the individual cost of accepting lower shares was relatively small, with the lowest
share member of these coalitions averaging $2.90 ($1.46) less than predicted as inex-
perienced (experienced) subjects. These arguments are much less convincing when
17looking at Apex players, since Apex players are always almost sure to be included
in the winning coalition. In spite of this, Apex partners were taking substantially
smaller shares then predicted ($6.48 and $6.24 less, on average, for inexperienced
and experienced players respectively). As the next section shows, it appears that
equity considerations underlay the deviations in the case of the Apex player.
Second, the limited formateur￿s power in the BF games, compared to the pre-
dicted outcome, rests squarely on the fact that base players were almost certainly
rejecting shares approaching the SSPE prediction in these games, so that oﬀering
the SSPE share did not maximize expected income. This is discussed in detail in
Section 4.3 below, where voting behavior is analyzed.
4.2 Proposals and Demands in the Apex1/3 Treatment
The general inability of the Apex player to enjoy a ￿rst-mover advantage (often
actually experience a ￿rst-mover disadvantage), in conjunction with the much higher
than predicted frequency of base formateurs partnering with the Apex player in the
BF games, is strikingly at odds with the BF theory. One does not need to look very
far for a candidate explanation of these deviations. The extensive experimental
literature on bilateral bargaining games (see Roth, 1995, for a survey) indicates
that players are likely to be motivated, in part, by minimum equity considerations
regarding their own payoﬀs.22 These equity considerations work in opposition to the
greater bargaining power the Apex player has, since the Apex player, when included
in a winning coalition, takes home a much larger share of the cake than base players
do. That is, other things equal, it is much easier to satisfy any minimum equity
considerations for Apex players compared to base players.23 One way to neutralize
these equity considerations across players is to limit the ￿take-home￿ pay of the
Apex player to 1/3 of the Apex player￿s share ￿ as if the Apex subject were just
a representative player for a three-member party, with equal payoﬀ division inside
the party. This way the ex-ante payoﬀ of the Apex player is equalized to that of
the base players, thereby largely restoring equity between player types. For both
the BF and DB games this change in the take-home pay for the Apex player has
no impact on the subgame perfect equilibrium predictions. The Apex1/3 treatment
also acts as a stand-in for the fact that in real legislative settings payoﬀsm u s tb e
22The studies of legislative bargaining games (McKelvey, 1991; Frechette, Kagel and Lehrer, 2003;
Frechette, Kagel and Morelli, 2003) indicate similar factors at work there as well.
23This would, of course, not be true if equity considerations co-varied with player power.
18Frequency bargaining ends in stage 1 Frequency of MWC
Apex1/3 BF DB BF DB
Inexperienced 71.7% (1.8) [12] 72.6% (1.4) [6] 73.3% 93.6%
Experienced 80.0% (1.3) [4] 100.0% (1.0) [1] 79.5% 86.6%
Table 6: Frequency of bargaining rounds that end in stage 1and MWCs. Average
[maximum] number of stages in parentheses [square brackets].
shared between coalition partners constituting the Apex voting block.
Procedures were essentially the same for the Apex1/3 treatment as for the other
treatments, with two inexperienced, and one experienced, subject sessions running
for both BF and DB.24 The only modi￿cation in the screen layouts was to report
the nominal share allocated to the Apex player along with the amount of money
that player would actually receive.
For both DB and BF sessions the vast majority of games ended in stage 1 and
involved MWCs, with no systematic diﬀerences, on these dimensions, compared to
the earlier Apex sessions.
1. Even though according to the theory there should be no diﬀerence whatsoever
between theApexgameand the Apex1/3 game, there are systematic behavioral
eﬀects from the reduction of the take-home pay of Apex players:
(a) Under both BF and DB, Apex players now obtain a very small advantage
as formateurs, as opposed to a disadvantage in the Apex treatment.
(b) Apex players require a much larger nominal share of the pie when invited
into MWCs by base players in the BF game and when closing coalitions
in the DB game.
(c) Base formateurs in the BF game now invite the Apex player into MWCs
much less often than in the Apex game, averaging 39.0% (42.0%) for
inexperienced (experienced) subjects, as opposed to 70.4% (73.5%) in
the Apex treatment.
2. While other characteristics remain the same as in the Apex game:
24Fifteen subjects each in the inexperienced subject sessions and the experienced BF session, and
t e ns u b j e c t si nt h ee x p e r i e n c e dD Bs e s s i o n .
19Apex1/3 Treatment
Baron-Ferejohn Base Formateur Apex Partner Apex Formateur Base Partner
Inexperienced 0.283 [.571] 0.717 [.429] 0.775 [.857] 0.225 [.143]
Experienced 0.267 [.571] 0.733 [.429] 0.761 [.857] 0.239 [.143]
Demand Bargaining
Inexperienced 0.290 [.250] 0.710 [.750] 0.779 [.750] 0.221 [.250]
Experienced 0.238 [.250] 0.763 [.750] 0.829 [.750] 0.171 [.250]
Table 7: Allocations Passed for MWCs
(a) There is essentially no impact on the shares base formateurs are able to
obtain when forming a coalition with all base players.25
(b) Base formateurs in both the BF game and the DB game (for inexperienced
players in the latter case) display some small formateur advantage.
To decompose the bene￿ts associated with being the Apex player, compare the
Apex player￿s shares in Table 7 with those reported in Tables 4 and 5. Since the
diﬀerence between the average share of an Apex player in the Apex treatment and
the average share of a base player in the equal weight treatment is the net result of
the (positive) bargaining power eﬀect and the (negative) equity consideration eﬀect,
we normalize the diﬀerence between the average share the Apex player obtained in
the Apex1/3 game and the average share of the base player in the Equal Weight
treatment as 100% of the increase associated with being the Apex player, after
correcting for equity considerations. For inexperienced players in the BF games, with
the Apex player as formateur, 69.8% of the increase can be attributed to the increase
in voting power, with the remaining 30.2% attributed to the ￿equity￿ correction.
The percentages change somewhat for the Apex player as coalition partner, with
57.7% of the increase due to increased voting power, and the remaining 42.2% due
to the equity correction.26 The corresponding percentages of voting power eﬀect
for the DB games are 69.2% as ￿rst mover and 77.6% as second mover closing the
coalition. Thus:
Conclusion 4 (FA, MWC) In both DB and BF games voting power accounts for
25Average shares for allocations passed of 0.282 (0.242) and 0.260 (0.250) for inexperienced and
experienced players respectively (with highest coalition partner￿s share in parentheses).
26The baseline in this case, and in the DB calculations, is the highest average share among
coalition partners.
20roughly 2
3 of the diﬀerence between the average share of Apex formateurs in the
Apex1/3 treatment and the average share of a base player in the equal weight treat-
ment, the remaining third being represented by an equity consideration adjustment.
For Apex partners, the equity consideration eﬀect is twice as large in BF games as
in DB games.
4.3 Voting Patterns
In the BF game voting is explicit, as each proposal that is recognized is voted up or
down by everyone. For DB games any time a player has a chance to close a coalition
she is in eﬀect voting for or against a given allocation. For example, take the Equal
Weight treatment and suppose that the ￿rst two players have each demanded a 0.4
share of the pie. Then the third player can close the coalition by accepting a 0.2
share, or she can demand a larger share, so that in eﬀect closing (not closing) the
coalition is a vote in favor of (against) a 0.2 share. Of course, there are far fewer
￿votes￿ in the DB game than in the BF game, but there are suﬃcient numbers of
observations to clearly identify voting patterns.27
F i g u r e s1 ,2 ,a n d3s u m m a r i z ev o t e s ,b ys h a r e so ﬀered for both DB and BF
games pooling over experience levels in all cases, and distinguishing between base
and Apex players in the Apex games.28 As the ￿gures illustrate, the probability
of acceptance increases with share in all cases. Looking at base players in the
BF games, oﬀers of $12 in the Equal Weight treatment and $8.57 in the Apex
treatment should be accepted according to the SSPE, but have little, if any, chance
of being accepted in practice. Predicted voting patterns are also violated for base
players in the DB games. In this case shares between $15 and $20 should always
be rejected in the Equal Weight treatment and always accepted in the Apex and
Apex1/3 treatments. This does not happen: In all cases only a small percentage of
$18 (and above) shares are consistently rejected, and a large proportion of $13-$20
shares are accepted. Apex players in BF games essentially reject all shares below
$24, and accept most shares at or above $28, which is quite close to their predicted
cut oﬀ point of $25.71 under the SSPE. In contrast, Apex players in DB games
accept between 70-80% of all allocations greater than or equal to $28, which is well
below their SPE cutoﬀ point.
27The maximum share the subject can request to form a minimal winning coalition is used in all
cases.
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Figure 3: Apex1/3: Votes by Shares (represented in dollar amounts)
23A more nuanced look at voting patterns is obtained through random eﬀect pro-
bits.29 An initial set of probits were run to determine the sensitivity of votes to




0 + β1bSit + β2aSit + β3PSit + β4D2
it + β5D3
it + β6D4
it + αi + νit ≥ 0
“
(1)
where I {•} is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the left hand side of the
inequality inside the brackets is greater than or equal to zero and 0 otherwise.
Explanatory variables include own share (Sit), the share the proposer takes (PS),
and dummy variables Dj,j =2 ,3,4, taking value one if the proposal on the ￿oor
included j members.30 The dummy variable a takes value one for Apex players,
and the dummy b takes value one for base players. From this general speci￿cation
o n ec a nd e r i v et h es p e c i a lc a s eo ft h er e g r e s s i o nf o rt h eE q u a lW e i g h tt r e a t m e n tb y
dropping β1aSit.
In all the regressions own share is the key determinant of voting for or against a
proposal. The dummy variables Dj,j=2 ,3,4, fail to achieve statistical signi￿cance
at anything approaching conventional levels for any of the data sets, indicating the
following: (i) subjects had little, if any, concern for other subjects getting zero
shares as long as their own share was large enough; (ii) there were no systematic
diﬀerences in acceptance thresholds in cases where the money is divided between
two, three, four, or ￿ve subjects. The variable PS achieved statistical signi￿cance
in the Apex treatments but not in the Equal Weight treatment.31 Given all this,




0 + β1aSit + β2bSit + β3PSit + αi + νit ≥ 0
“
(2)
For DB sessions, recall that only the data about the movers who had the pos-
sibility to close a majority coalition are considered votes. The initial set of probits




0 + β1aSit + β2bSit + β3HSit + αi + νit ≥ 0
“
(3)
where HS is the highest share in the previous requests among the requests forming
29The probits employ a one way subject error component.
30The excluded cathegory is the one where funds were distributed to all ￿ve voters.
31These results are robust to speci￿cations in which the PS variable was permitted to take on
diﬀerent values for base versus Apex proposers.
24Equal Weight Apex Apex1/3
Inexp Exp Inexp Exp Inexp Exp
S. - 1 vote 19.988*** 25.023*** 11.875*** 26.630*** 15.950*** 25.507***
(2.640) (5.883) (1.349) (9.327) (1.544) (5.882)
S. ￿ Apex NA NA 6.466*** 16.028*** 5.224*** 9.956***
(1.122) (5.951) (0.897) (3.065)
PS -1.051 -1.286 -1.336** -5.790** 0.51 -0.132
(1.027) (2.129) (0.535) (2.491) (0.494) (1.024)
Constant -4.033*** -5.166*** -1.710*** -0.792 -2.783*** -3.685***
(0.709) (1.769) (0.381) (1.633) (0.417) (0.995)
ρ 0.307*** 0.256 0.544*** 0.781*** 0.271*** 0.561***
IP ￿ 1 vote 0.223 0.229 0.200 0.143 0.159 0.147
($13.39) ($13.74) ($11.98) ($8.57) ($9.54) ($8.81)
IP ￿ Apex NA NA 0.367 0.239 0.485 0.376
($21.99) ($14.32) ($29.11) ($22.56)
Obs. 404 192 444 168 420 152
Table 8: Voting Patterns in Baron-Ferejohn
the cheapest potential coalition.32 The HS variable is meant to mirror what PS
captures in the BF probits. There is no equivalent for the number of subjects
included in the distribution in this case. However, the HS variable failed to achieve
statistical signi￿cance at anything approaching conventional levels and/or had an
incorrect sign (in one case β3 < 0), so that the speci￿cation reported excludes HS.33
As with the BF sessions, own share is statistically signi￿cant for all of the data sets
for which there are a reasonable number of observations.
Table 8 reports the regression results for the BF sessions, along with estimates





α is the variance of the subject speci￿cr a n d o me ﬀects.
As such ρ measures the extent of the individual subject eﬀects, or the dispersion
in the likelihood of acceptance across individual subjects.34 From the coeﬃcient
estimates, using the mean value of PS for the treatment in question, we compute
32For instance, in the Equal Weight condition, if there were three requests prior to yours, 0.5,
0.4, and 0.3, HS would equal 0.4.
33The results reported are robust to alternative speci￿cations in which the HS variable was
p e r m i t t e dt ot a k eo nd i ﬀerent values for Apex and base proposers.
34ρ has a minimum value of 0 (no individual subject eﬀects) and a maximum value of 1 (all the
variance is explained by individual subject eﬀects).
25the share that the average voter requires just to be indiﬀerent between accepting or
rejecting a proposed allocation. These indiﬀerence points in both shares and dollars
are reported at the bottom of the table. Our focus is on the indiﬀerence points for
inexperienced voters (as these coeﬃcient estimates are substantially more reliable,
especially in the Apex treatments because of the limited number of observations
for experienced subjects). For base players indiﬀerence points are essentially the
same between the Equal Weight and the Apex treatment, around $13.50, slightly
above the $12 cutoﬀ under the SSPE. This drops rather sharply under the Apex1/3
treatment to $8.94, which is not much above the SSPE share of $8.57. Similarly, the
indiﬀerence point for the average Apex player jumps from $21.82 to $29.87 in going
from the Apex to the Apex1/3 treatment, bracketing the $25.71 predicted under
the SSPE. The reduced demands of the base players and the increased demands
o ft h eA p e xp l a y e r si nt h eA p e x 1/3 treatment were what was anticipated when
implementing this treatment, as Apex players require a larger nominal payoﬀ to
compensate for the fact that they are only getting a 1/3s h a r eo ft h eA p e x￿ b l o c k ￿ s ￿
payoﬀ. Although this should not happen according to the theory, it is consistent with
t h en o t i o nt h a ts u b j e c t sh a v es o m el o w e rb o u n do np a y o ﬀs that they are willing to
accept independent of continuation values (and/or they do not compute continuation
values). At the same time, the large diﬀerence in cut-oﬀ values between Apex and
base players makes it clear that subjects respond to the presence of bargaining power
asymmetries.
¿From the voting regressions we can compute the share formateurs should oﬀer
to maximize their expected return and compare this with the shares actually oﬀered
and their expected return had they played according to the SSPE. These shares
are consistently well above the indiﬀerence points reported in Table 8, as the latter
are based on average responses. In contrast, the formateur must cope with the
dispersion in minimal thresholds across subjects, so that oﬀers equal to the average
indiﬀerence point have only a 50% chance of being accepted. Taking the dispersion
in thresholds into account, in the Equal Weight treatment a share of 0.293 ($17.57)
to each coalition partner maximizes the formateurs￿ expected return at $21.80.35
In contrast, had the formateur played according to the SSPE, the expected return














￿(Continuation Value) where Pr(s) is the estimated probability that
as h a r eo fs is accepted using the random eﬀects probits. The continuation value is approximated
by the average payoﬀ.
26Equal Weight Apex Apex1/3
Inexp Exp Inexp Exp Inexp Exp
S. - 1 vote 5.343*** 17.447*** 3.611*** 30.382 6.305*** 12.580***
(0.798) (3.931) (0.791) (18.865) (0.999) (4.559)
S. - Apex 3.259*** 4.866* 3.132*** 3.098**
(0.794) (2.519) (0.626) (1.480)
Constant -1.483*** -4.504*** (1.183) -1.124*** -2.675* -1.843*** -1.659**
(0.275) (0.341) (1.600) (0.277) (0.813)
ρ 0.150*** 0.583*** 0.415*** 0.000 0.426*** 0.408***
IP ￿ 1 vote 0.277 0.258 0.311 0.088 0.292 0.132
($16.65) ($15.49) ($18.67) ($5.28) ($17.54) ($7.91)
IP ￿ Apex NA NA 0.345 0.550 0.588 0.535
($20.69) ($32.98) ($35.31) ($32.13)
Obs. 254 115 241 87 390 69
Table 9: Voting Patterns in Demand Bargaining
would have been only $14.01. The much lower expected return for the SSPE re￿ects
the much higher probability of at least one of the coalition partners rejecting the
SSPE share. Similar calculations for the Apex treatments shows that the Apex
player would maximize expected return by oﬀering shares of 0.283 ($16.97) and
0.232 ($13.92) for the Apex and Apex1/3 treatments, respectively, yielding expected
returns of $38.66 and $43.83.36 This compares to expected returns of $34.18 and
$39.73 if oﬀering the SSPE share. Base players would maximize expected returns by
oﬀering shares of 0.495 and 0.515 to the Apex player under the Apex and Apex1/3
treatments, yielding expected returns of $23.71 and $19.45, compared to expected
returns of $23.09 and $18.74 for oﬀering the SSPE share. With the exception of
the base player￿s income maximizing share for the Apex1/3 treatment, all of these
shares are reasonably close to the average shares reported in Table 4.
Table 9 reports the regression results for the DB sessions along with the implied
share that the average voter requires to be indiﬀerent between closing or not closing
the coalition. With the exception of the Apex player in the Apex treatment, indif-
ference points are larger in DB than BF for comparable treatments, as the theory
36In this case the formula used is Expected value = Pr(1 − Share to Self) ￿ (Share to Self) +
(1 − Pr(1 − Share to Self)) ￿ (Continuation Value) where the continuation value is approximated
by the average payoﬀ of Apex players.
27predicts. However, these diﬀerences are not nearly as large as predicted. The indif-
ference point for Apex players in the Apex treatment is only slightly higher than for
base players, but is considerably higher in the Apex1/3 treatment. This should not
happen according to the theory, but is again consistent with the notion that sub-
jects have some lower bound on payoﬀs that they are willing to accept, so that the
cut in the Apex player￿s ￿take-home￿ pay has this eﬀect. Finally, the indiﬀerence
point for the Apex player in the Apex treatment is surprisingly close to that of the
base players, even though the Apex player was almost certain to be included in any
winning coalition.
Conclusion 5 Own share of the bene￿ts was the key factor aﬀecting voting for
or against a proposed allocation, with essentially no concern for players left out of
MWCs when deciding how to vote.
Conclusion 6 Average shares required to vote favorably on a proposed allocation
were consistently larger under DB than BF, as the theory predicts. But these diﬀer-
ences were not nearly as large as predicted. Apex players in the Apex1/3 treatment
required substantially larger shares than in the Apex treatment, consistent with the
notion that subjects have some lower bound on payoﬀst h e ya r ew i l l i n gt oa c c e p t .
Acceptance thresholds were, however, sensitive to strategic considerations as witness
the large diﬀerences in average acceptance thresholds between base players and Apex
players in the BF treatment.
Finally, note that the sharp increase (decrease) in the indiﬀerence point for Apex
(base) players in going from the Apex to the Apex1/3 treatments is accompanied
by virtually no change in the average number of steps required to complete a bar-
gaining round. This suggests some sense of shared social norms regarding minimum
acceptable shares, as otherwise we would expect these changes to generate consider-
ably more disagreements (hence more steps to complete a bargaining round) in the
Apex1/3 treatment.
5 Comparisons with Field Data
A key arena for distinguishing between demand based and oﬀer based models of
legislative bargaining with ￿eld data has involved analyzing the share of cabinet
posts held within coalition governments in parliamentary democracies as a function
28of parties￿ relative voting strength. The two most recent eﬀorts along these lines
have been explicitly designed to distinguish between demand based and oﬀer based
bargaining models using Morelli (1999) and Baron-Ferejohn (1989) as their respec-
tive reference points (see Warwick and Druckman, 2001, and Ansolabehere et al.,
2003).
Warwick and Druckman, and the studies preceding theirs (e.g., Browne and
Frendreis, 1980) measure a party￿s voting strength in terms of the share of legisla-
tive seats each party contributes to the winning coalition (as opposed to the share
of seats each party in the winning coalition has in the legislature as a whole). These
studies consistently ￿nd that a party￿s share of cabinet posts is linearly related to
its share of legislative seats within the coalition government, and that there is little
or no advantage to being the formateur. (Warwick and Druckman ￿nd a signi￿cant
formateur eﬀect after weighting cabinet posts according to their importance, with
signi￿cant importance given to the prime minister￿s seat). Given the linear relation-
ship and the general absence of a formateur eﬀect these studies conclude in favor of
the DB approach.
Ansolabehere et al. re-analyze the Warwick and Druckman data employing a
measure of a party￿s voting-weight within the legislature, not their share of seats
within the winning coalition, as the primary regressor.37 Seat shares do not generally
equal voting-weight shares, and voting-weight shares constitute the key factor un-
derlying legislative bargaining power. Ansolabehere et al. also develop a framework
for nesting the DB and BF approaches, and estimate the model using both voting-
weight shares and shares of seats within the governing coalition. They conclude
that the data favors the BF model as they ￿nd a statistically signi￿cant formateur
eﬀect both with and without weighting the prime minister￿s (PM￿s) portfolio more
than other portfolios, and the coeﬃcient value for voting-weight shares is close to
1.0. They note, however, that the estimated formateur eﬀect is signi￿cantly lower
than predicted under BF ￿ one third of the predicted value for the unweighted data,
and one half of the predicted value when weighting the PM￿s portfolio.
The analogue to these approaches for the experimental data is to use the share of
bene￿ts obtained by a subject as the dependent variable in the regression, and to use
either the share of votes that a subject contributes to the winning coalition, or its
37They also add two additional countries and several more years of data, but the analysis makes
it clear that this has no material eﬀect on the diﬀerences between their results and those reported
in Warwick and Druckman.
29Baron-Ferejohn Games Demand Bargaining Games Warwick and Druchmana
Speci￿cation 1 Inexp. Exp. Inexp. Exp. Unweighted Weighted
Share of Votes 0.94*** 0.90*** 0.93*** 1.01*** 0.915***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
R2 0.91 0.87 0.88 0.95 -
Speci￿cation 2
Share of Votes 0.83*** 0.77*** 0.90*** 0.91*** 1.049*** 0.859***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Form.*Share of Votes 0.29*** 0.44*** 0 .08* 0.18*** -0.182*** 0.135***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
R2 0.93 0.92 0.88 0.96 - -
No. Obs. 345 171 348 137 - -
a From Warwick and Druchman (2001)
*S i g n i ￿cantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10% level
*** Signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level
Table 10: Estimates of Payoﬀ Shares as a Function of Vote Share in Winning Coali-
tion (standard errors in parentheses)
Baron-Ferejohn Games Demand Bargaining Games Field Dataa
Inexp. Exp. Inexp Exp Unweighted PM weighted
Constant 0.07*** 0.13*** 0.09*** -0.07** 0.07*** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Voting Weight 0.99*** 0.75*** 1.01*** 1.80*** 01.12*** 0.98***
(0.09) (0.05) (0.11) (0.15) (0.05) (0.05)
Formateur 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.15*** 0.25***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
R2 0.54 0.61 0.39 0.78 0.72 0.82
No. Obs. 345 171 348 137 682 682
a From Ansolabehere et al (2003)
** Signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level
*** Signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level
Table 11: Estimates of Payoﬀ Shares as a Function of Voting weights (clustered
standard errors in parentheses)
30voting-weight share, as the key explanatory variable.38 As in the ￿eld data analysis,
we use a dummy variable to test the importance of being a formateur. We pool
the data from the Apex and Equal Weight treatments in the regressions reported.
Similar results are obtained when pooling over the Apex1/3 and the Equal Weight
treatments (see Tables 13 and 14 reported in the appendix). Separate estimates are
reported for the BF and DB games.
Table 10 reports the results of these regressions using the Warwick and Druck-
man speci￿cation, along with the estimated coeﬃcient values reported from their
study. The ￿rst thing to notice is that it is diﬃcult to distinguish between DB and
BF games based on the coeﬃcient estimates reported. In both cases the coeﬃcient
values for share of votes are reasonably close to 1.0. Further, in both cases the
formateur dummy is statistically signi￿cant, with the major diﬀerence being the
substantially larger coeﬃcient value for the BF games. Thus, one cannot decide be-
tween speci￿cations based on the statistical signi￿cance of the formateur dummy, as
tends to be done when analyzing the ￿eld data, or on the linear relationship between
shares and ￿seats,￿ as these characteristics are present in the experimental data for
both BF and DB games. Finally, independent of whether or not the underlying
game structure is BF or DB, our coeﬃcient estimates are remarkably close to those
reported in Warwick and Druckman, with the notable exception of the formateur
dummy for their unweighted data.
Table 11 reports the regression results using the Ansolabehere et al. speci￿ca-
tion. Here too it is diﬃc u l tt od i s t i n g u i s hb e t w e e nB Fa n dD Bg a m e sb a s e do nt h e
regressions results. In both cases, the constant (which, in theory, should be zero) is
statistically signi￿c a n t ,a si ti si nt h e￿eld data. The coeﬃcient values for voting-
weight share are very close to 1.0 for inexperienced subjects in both DB and BF
games as Ansolabehere et al. claim should be the case for BF games alone. The coef-
￿cients for the formateur dummy are statistically signi￿cant for both the DB and BF
games, so that on this basis alone there is no way to distinguish between DB or BF
type games as Ansolabehere et al. do. Finally, using Ansolabehere et al.￿s regression
speci￿cation, the estimated coeﬃcient value for voting-weight share in conjunction
with the average voting weight in the underlying data yield a predicted value for the
38Payoﬀ shares are perfectly divisible, eliminating the ￿lumpiness￿ problem associated with using
portfolios as the dependent variable in the regression. The ￿eld data also suﬀer from problems in-
evitably associated with attempts to weight the relative importance of diﬀerent portfolios. Further,
we can compute voting weight shares directly, whereas Ansolabehere et al. use an algorithm to
compute these values from seats held.
31formateur dummy, which they use to determine how short the predicted formateur
eﬀect is from the actual eﬀect. Applying this procedure to our data, the predicted
value for the formateur dummy is 0.415, compared to an estimated value in the BF
games of 0.14 (0.16) for inexperienced (experienced) subjects. This yields the same
r a t i oo fa c t u a lt op r e d i c t e de ﬀect (approximately 1/3) as reported in Ansolabehere
et al. for the unweighted ￿eld data. Finally, viewed overall, there is little diﬀerence
between the estimates using either of our data sets (BF or DB) for inexperienced
subjects versus the ￿eld data reported in Ansolabehere et al.
The reasons for the diﬃculty in distinguishing between DB and BF games with
the experimental data in these regressions is reasonably transparent: Although the
two models make very diﬀerent predictions regarding ex-post bargaining outcomes,
realized diﬀerences in bargaining power are not nearly as large as predicted, while
base players enjoy a ￿rst-mover advantage in both DB and BF games. Thus, behav-
iorally the two models are much closer to each other than one would predict, so that
deciding between them on the basis of a linear relationship between voting shares
and payoﬀ shares, or the presence or absence of a statistically signi￿cant formateur
eﬀect, would appear to be doomed to failure.39
Table 12 makes this point absolutely clear. These regressions are based on the
Apex and Equal Weight treatments, but instead of using actual behavior we use
simulated subjects who behave according to the BF and DB models￿ predictions.
The regression results under either the Warwick and Druckman or Ansolabehere
et al. speci￿cations clearly identify the nature of the game being played by the
s i m u l a t e ds u b j e c t s . F o rt h eB Fg a m e s ,t h eW a r w i c ka n dD r u c k m a ns p e c i ￿cation
yields a coeﬃcient value for the interaction term between formateur and share of
votes (Fi*Share of Votes) which is positive and very large relative to what is typically
reported, indicating a strong formateur eﬀect.40 Similarly, for the BF games, the
39The one noticeable diﬀerence between the regressions in the text and those in the Appendix
(which pool data from the Apex1/3 treatment and the Equal Weight treatment) is a substantially
larger coeﬃcient value for voting weight, and a somewhat smaller formateur eﬀect, in the latter
for both BF and DB games. This re￿ects the loss in formateur power for base players in Apex1/3
games compared to the Apex games. However, here too it is essentially impossible to distinguish
b e t w e e nB Fa n dD Bg a m e sb a s e do nt h ec o e ﬃcient values reported from the regressions.
40Note that excluding the interaction term between Fi*Share of Votes, as was done in earlier
studies (e.g., Browne and Franklin, 1973) gives the totally misleading impression that the data
is generated by a DB type process, as the coeﬃcient value for Share of Votes is not signi￿cantly
diﬀerent from 1.0, and is essentially the same value as when the data is actually generated by a DB
process (see the ￿rst column under Demand Bargaining Data).
32Ansolabehere et al. speci￿cation yields a formateur dummy that is large and positive,
the coeﬃcient value for voting weight is close to 1.0, and the implied value of the
formateur based on the coeﬃcient value for voting-weight, in conjunction with the
average voting weight, is within a reasonably close neighborhood of the estimated
value for the formateur dummy. In contrast, when the data are generated by subjects
behaving in strict conformity with the DB model, the Warwick and Druckman
speci￿cation correctly characterizes the process as the Fi*Share of Votes variable
is not signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero, and the coeﬃcient value for Share of Votes
is just slightly above 1.0. In this case the Ansolabehere et al. speci￿cation clearly
points to an absence of formateur power as, although the Fi dummy is signi￿cantly
diﬀerent from zero (due to speci￿cation error), it is trivial in size. And the voting-
weight variable is reasonably closer to 2.0, the predicted value under DB in their
speci￿cation.41 Thus, it is not the diﬀerences in the regression speci￿cations that
prevent distinguishing between DB and BF, but rather the fact that there is much
more similarity in actual behavior as opposed to what the two theories predict.
Conclusion 7 Replicating regressions like those performed with ￿e l dd a t af o rt h e
experimental data, we are unable to clearly distinguish between BF and DB games,
as a result of the similarities between the actual behaviors. Further, there are a
number of striking similarities between the regression estimates from the experimen-
tal data and the ￿eld data. This suggests, among other things, that the relatively
weak formateur power reported for BF games in the laboratory is very likely to be
weak in the ￿e l dd a t aa sw e l l .
6 Summary and Conclusions
This paper examines, experimentally, the predictions of the leading alternating-
oﬀer (Baron-Ferejohn, 1989) and demand bargaining (Morelli, 1999) approaches to
legislative bargaining, in games where players have equal real voting power and in
Apex games where one player has disproportionate (real) voting power. The models
make distinctly diﬀerent predictions regarding the ex post distribution of bene￿ts
41Ansolabehere et al. claim to have a regression speci￿cation that nests DB and BF. The ap-
proximations in their model introduce some small speci￿cation errors, but these do not distract
from clearly distinguishing between the DB and BF games for our simulated treatments. These
approximations are likely to be signi￿cant for parliaments comprised of very few political parties
with real voting power
33Baron-Ferejohn Data Demand Bargaining Data
W. and D. Ans. et al. W. and D. Ans. et al.
Share of Votes 1.01*** 0.64*** 1.09*** 1.10***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
Fi*Share of Votes 0.77*** -0.03
(0.09) (0.07)






R2 0.58 0.66 1.00 0.78 0.78 1.00
No. Obs. 316 316 316 304 304 304
*, **, *** Signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Table 12: Simulated Data (standard errors in parentheses)
between parties, with the BF model predicting a sharply skewed distribution in
favor of the proposer and the DB approach predicting shares proportionate to real
voting power. These diﬀerent predictions have formed the basis for distinguishing
between the two models using ￿eld data.
The experimental data show proposer power for base players in BF games, and
show that bene￿ts shift substantially in favor of the player with greater real voting
power (the Apex player) in both DB and BF games, all of which are consistent
with the models￿ predictions. However, the sharp diﬀerences in ex-post shares that
the theory predicts between BF and DB games fail to materialize, as a result of
formateurs￿ failure to obtain anything approaching the large shares predicted in the
BF games. The latter can be directly attributed to the reluctance of players to take
the small shares predicted under the SSPE in the BF games, which is consistent
with the large body of experimental data from alternating-oﬀer bilateral bargaining
games (Roth, 1995). However, in this case it is not so much what the average base
player is willing to accept that is responsible (as the average willingness to accept is
reasonably close to the SSPE prediction). Rather, it is the between subject variation
in what base players are willing to accept that is responsible, so that to maximize
34expected income formateurs need to oﬀer substantially more than the SSPE share,
or else face very high rejection rates.
Using the experimental data to conduct regressions similar to those reported
with ￿eld data for distinguishing between BF and DB bargaining models, we are
unable to distinguish between which game subjects are playing using the criteria
typically applied with the ￿eld data. Further, there are a number of strong similar-
ities between our regressions results and those reported with the ￿eld data. These
results can be attributed to the fact that, contrary to the theory, there is a limited
￿rst-mover advantage in DB games, and proposer power is much more limited than
predicted in the BF games. At a minimum these regression results suggest that it
is likely to be very hard to distinguish between game forms using the ￿eld data in
the way it has been done in the past. As a general methodological point, these re-
sults demonstrate the relevance of a closer interaction of experimental and ￿eld data
analysis, in order to avoid drawing inference from speci￿cations that are identi￿ed
in the traditional sense but may not be behaviorally identi￿ed.
The regression results also suggest that the limited formateur power reported
for the BF games in the laboratory closely parallels the ￿eld data, as the diﬀerence
between predicted and realized formateur power is remarkably similar in both cases.
This has signi￿cant implications for the external validity of our experimental results,
and by extension, for the large body of results from the experimental literature on
bilateral bargaining games.
There have been a number of earlier experimental studies of the Apex game, us-
ing a more or less free form of bargaining between players. These experiments were
designed to assess the implications of various cooperative bargaining solutions. The
two closest in spirit to our games are Selten and Schuster (1968) and Horowitz and
Rapoport (1974).42 Selten and Schuster employed free form communication with
face-to-face bargaining, and permitted all possible coalitions to form. Horowitz and
Rapoport limited communication to a small preselected set of messages without
allowing players to hear or to see each other, and restricted outcomes to MWCs.
The vast majority of games, 83.3% (10/12), involved MWCs in Selten and Schuster.
Among MWCs the vast majority involved the Apex player in both cases: 80.0%
(8/10) in Selten and Schuster and 91.7% (11/12) in Horowitz and Rapoport. 43 For
42Both used cash payments contingent on performance and 5 person Apex games. See Oliver
(1980) for a summary of this and related earlier studies of the Apex game.
43For Horowitz and Rapoport we only consider games for which payoﬀs were the same for coali-
tions including the Apex player and all base player coalitions.
35MWCs including the Apex player, base player shares averaged 0.435 in Selten and
Schuster and 0.283 in Horowitz and Rapoport, as opposed to shares of 0.250 pre-
dicted under the leading cooperative bargaining models.44 Further, in Horowitz and
Rapoport there were minimal diﬀerences in shares achieved conditional on whether
the base player or the Apex player was permitted to communicate ￿rst.45 These
results are similar to ours in the sense that (i) the overwhelming number of MWCs
included the Apex player and (ii) the Apex player￿s average share of the pie failed
to achieve the 75% mark, by a minimal amount in Horowitz and Rapoport and by
a more substantial amount in Selten and Schuster.
The results of these multilateral bargaining experiments are both informed by,
and have implications, for the growing literature on ￿other regarding￿ preferences
in the economics literature. With respect to the latter we make three points.
First, note the simultaneous pattern of voters ignoring the zero payoﬀst on o n -
coalition partners when voting in the BF game, while the same voters, in a minority
of cases, propose supermajorities as formateurs (and do the same as closers in the
DB game, occasionally leaving relatively small amounts of money over for later
players). While the supermajorities might be rationalized as mistakes on the part of
proposers (or closers), they are persistent in the data, suggesting that they are not
mistakes. This pattern of simultaneously ignoring zero payoﬀsf o rs o m ep l a y e r sw h e n
voting, while proposing supermajorities is,h o w e v e r ,c o n s i s t e n tw i t hB o l t o n ,K a t o k
and Zwick￿s (1998) notion of ￿I￿m no saint￿: Proposers and closers are willing to give
a little money away, but when faced with the prospect of a respectable allocation
to themselves, and giving zero to non-coalition members, versus potentially being
shut out of the money entirely (if they vote no), the expected cost of rejecting such
proposals is just too high to pass up.
Second, methods for establishing asymmetric power in bilateral bargaining games
are limited to setting up diﬀerent outside options for players, diﬀerent discount rates,
or diﬀerent risk preferences. These options have been subject to limited exploration
(see Roth, 1995, for a review). In multilateral bargaining games, in addition to
these options, it is most natural to consider diﬀerential voting weights, as in the
Apex game. In doing so we can directly compare the eﬀects of real changes in
44These were the main simple solution of von Neuman and Morgenstern (1947) and the compet-
itive bargaining set (Horowitz, 1973).
45However, in Horowitz and Rapoport￿s Apex games with 4 subjects, there were substantial
diﬀerences in shares achieved, with signi￿c a n t l yl a r g e ra v e r a g es h a r e sf o rt h eb a s ep l a y e rw h e nb a s e
players were permitted to communicate ￿rst.
36voting strength versus equity considerations or other regarding preferences. Results
from the present experiment show that Apex players do exercise a fair amount
of the power granted them, taking substantially larger shares for themselves than
base players do in the Equal Weight games. It is true that equity considerations
p l a yar o l eh e r ea si n d i c a t e db yt h ed i ﬀerences between the Apex and Apex1/3
treatments, but voting weight accounts for about two-thirds of the gain to be had
from an Apex treatment in which equity considerations have been corrected for (the
Apex1/3 treatment). Further, minimum acceptable payoﬀs are sensitive to these
strategic considerations as well, as witness the sharp reduction in the indiﬀerence
point for base players between the Apex and Apex1/3 BF games. Thus, there are
clearly both strategic factors and equity considerations guiding behavior in these
games, with sometimes subtle interactions.
Third, other regarding preferences appear to play a smaller role in DB than in
BF games. This shows up in two ways: (1) The amount of money left over after
closing a coalition in DB is smaller, on average, than the amount of money given to
redundant coalition partners in BF (a diﬀerence of about $5.00) and (2) the equity
consideration eﬀect identi￿ed through the Apex1/3 treatment is about twice as large
in BF games as in DB games. Two potential explanations for these diﬀerence come
immediately to mind. One is that it could be a framing eﬀect as in BF subjects must
directly consider allocations to all players, whereas in DB they just choose a share
for themselves. Thus, subjects are forced to think more directly about payoﬀst o
other in BF. Alternatively, it is much harder to exercise other regarding preferences
in DB; if as an early demander wants to leave money over for players likely to be
shut out of the coalition, there is no assurance that these players will actually get the
money as later demanders can simply take this excess for themselves. In contrast,
in BF one is giving the excess directly to the redundant players. It remains to sort
out between these two alternatives or others that come to mind.
There are a number of obvious and potentially important extensions to the
present line of research. First, what is the impact of pre-proposal communication
(cheap talk) that permits proposers to establish competition between potential coali-
tion partners? This would seem to be part of any real world legislative bargaining
process, and might well move proposer power closer to the BF predictions as it
would enable formateurs to distinguish between coalition partners willing to accept
smaller shares. What will be the impact of veto players on outcomes (see Winter,
1996 for predictions within the Baron-Ferejohn framework)? Is there a method for
37clearly distinguishing between the two bargaining models using ￿eld data, and what
will these results show? These and a number of other interesting and important
questions remain to be investigated.
387 Appendix: Proofs
No proof is necessary for the theoretical predictions of the BF model, since we just
applied without modi￿cations the original model. On the other hand, given that
the DB model used here is diﬀerent from the one in Morelli (1999),46 new proofs
are necessary for the DB apex game.
Proposition 1: Consider a 5-player apex DB game. (I) In every SPE outcome the
base player(s) included in the equilibrium MWC receive 1/4 of the money; (II) In
every SPE outcome the apex player receives 3/4 of the money iﬀ she belongs to the
equilibrium MWC; (III) The equilibrium MWC has four base players iﬀ the apex
player moves last; (IV) In all other cases the equilibrium winning coalition includes
t h ea p e xp l a y e ra n dab a s ep l a y e r .
Proof. Let da ∈ [0,1] denote the demand made by the apex player, and dbi the
demand by base player bi.L e tt h ei n d e xi be increasing in the order of play, i.e., b1
is the ￿rst base player moving, then b2, and so on. When player bi￿s turn to move
comes, she is the i-th mover if the apex player has not moved yet, or the i +1 - s t
mover if the apex has already moved. To compact notation, we say that player bi
moves in position i + I(r), where I(r)=1m e a n st h a ta has moved before round
r and I(r)=0m e a n st h a ta has not moved yet when round r comes. The formal
description of our proportional recognition probability assumption is as follows: for
each step r ∈ R ≡ {1,2,3,4},P r ( mr = a)( i . e . ,t h ep r o b .t h a tt h er-th mover is a)
equals (1 − I(r)) 3
8−r. (The computation of the corresponding residual probabilities
for the base players is left to the reader).
Denote by Wj the set of coalitions S such that S ∪ {j} is a winning coalition
(at least 4 votes). A strategy of a associates a demand da,p l u sad e c i s i o nS ∈
2{m1,...,mr−1} ∩ Wa about whether to close a MWC (and which one) if feasible, to
every combination of position and previous demands; a strategy of a base player
associates a demand dbi,p l u sad e c i s i o nS ∈ 2{m1,...,mr−1} ∩ Wbi about whether to
close a MWC (and which one) if feasible, to every combination of position, previous
demands, and weight of previous movers. In other words, a strategy of a is a
mapping from R ￿ [0,1]R−1 into [0,1] ￿ 2{m1,...,mR−1} ∩ Wa,a n das t r a t e g yf o rbi
is a mapping from R ￿ [0,1]i−1 ￿ [0,1]I(R) into [0,1] ￿ 2{m1,...,mR−1} ∩ Wbi.A s i n
46In the original model of DB the ￿rst randomized mover would choose the rest of the order of
play, whereas here every new mover has to come from a new randomization.
39Morelli (1999), the discount factor and the length of the game don￿t matter, so we
can describe the candidate equilibrium strategy pro￿le as if the game was over after
the ￿v ep l a y e r sh a v em a d eo n ed e m a n de a c h . F o rt h em o m e n t ,a s s u m et h a tt h e
continuation equilibrium expected payoﬀ for a base player if the ￿ve demands are
voided is ub ≤ 1
4. We will return to validate this hypothesis after completing the
equilibrium analysis given this hypothesis.
Consider the following candidate strategy pro￿le:
1. Apex:
(a) da = 3
4 if a moves ￿rst;
(b) If a moves at some r =2 ,3,4, a￿s action is:
i. If
Pr−1
i=1 dbi ≤ r−1
4 ,t h e n( da =( 1− mini<r dbi),S= {i}), where the
chosen base player i is br−1 if dbr−1 ≤ dbj ∀j<r− 1;
ii. If
Pr−1
i=1 dbi > r−1
4 ,t h e nda =m i n {(3
4 +
Pr−1
i=1 dbi − r−1
4 ),(1 − ub)};
(c) If the apex moves last (which means that the four base players have not
found an agreement), she closes with the bi such that dbi is less than or
equal to the other demands (once again breaking indiﬀerence in favor of





(a) db1 = 1
4 if the ￿rst mover is a base player;
(b) If bi moves at r =2 ,3w i t hI(r)=0 ,bi￿s action is









(c) If m4 = b4 (i.e., I(4) = 0), b4￿s demand is max{1 −
P3
i=1 dbi,mini<4 dbi}
(implicitly closing the base MWC if the max is the ￿rst term and implic-
itly inviting the apex to join if the max is the second term).
(d) If bi moves at r =2 ,3,4,5w i t hmr−1 = a, bi￿s action is:





4 and 1 − da ≥ ub;
ii. Demand max{ub, 1
4 − (
Pr−2
j=1 dbj − r−2
4 )} otherwise.47
47In this case (ii), if r =5a n dt h em a xi sub, then it means that we have to restart; if the max
is the other expression, it implicitly means that the MWC of all the base players is formed.
40All the other potential nodes can be ignored.
To see that this strategy pro￿le is an equilibrium, Let￿s check ￿rst that the
proposed strategy of the apex is a perfect best response to the proposed strategy
of base players. It is clear that when m1 = a any demand above 3
4 would induce
the other movers to exclude the apex, whereas demanding 3
4 the apex is sure to
be chosen right away, given that the second mover would have to demand strictly
less than 1
4 to be sure to be chosen by the subsequent movers against the apex. a￿s
action when she moves second, third, or fourth, is simply to close with the minimum
previous demander if the sum of the previous demands is less than r−1
4 ,a n dm a k e
just a demand otherwise: this is a best response, taking into account what would
be done by the subsequent mover. Finally, if the game reaches the node where the
apex player moves last, it is clear that there is no incentive for the apex to close any




70,w h e r e67
70 is the probability that the apex will be moving in one of the ￿rst four
positions in the next stage, and 3
4 is the assumed payoﬀ expectation conditional
on being in the MWC. To complete the proof that the candidate pro￿le described
above is an equilibrium we now need to consider all the decision nodes where a base
player moves. Note ￿r s tt h a ti fI(4) = 0 and m4 = b4,t h e ndb4 =m i n i<4 dbi is the
maximum demand b4 c a nm a k ei fs h ew a n t st oa t t r a c tt h ea p e x .H e n c eb4 chooses
such a demand if it is greater than 1 −
P3
i=1 dbi.W h e n bi moves at r =2 ,3w i t h
I(r) = 0, the logic behind the action described above is simply that the best thing
to do is to demand the same as the previous minimum demander, knowing that this
way the apex would choose her if the apex moves next. Knowing this, if m1 = b1
any db1 > 1
4 leads to be excluded, unless the apex will move last, which happens
with very low probability.
If m1 = a uniqueness of the continuation equilibrium is clear: any da > 3
4 cannot
be part of any SPE, because b1 can deviate demanding 1
4, counting on the fact that
perfection requires the subsequent movers to choose her over a because of da > 3
4.
Given da = 3
4, on the other hand, b1 strictly prefers to close, because if she demands
1
4 without closing the subsequent movers could eventually (one of them) close with
t h ea p e x . T h ea r g u m e n ta b o v ea b o u tt h ec a s ew h e r em1 = b1 and db1 > 1
4 is
also enough to guarantee uniqueness. If m2 = a, there cannot be any continuation
equilibrium where she closes and demands 1−db1, because she can demand 3
4+  and
be sure, for   small enough, that the subsequent mover will prefer to close with her
rather than demanding something compatible with the demand of b1.T h i si m p l i e s
41that if m2 = ab 1 surely receives zero payoﬀ if db1 > 1
4.I fm2 = b2, the latter will
choose to follow the strategy described above, since that comes just from perfection.
It is important to note that even though in principle the apex player is indiﬀerent
between closing with b1 or b2 if db1 = db2,o n l yc l o s i n gw i t hb2 can be an equilibrium
(otherwise b2 could deviate with   undercutting). Hence b2 can demand db2 = db1
b e i n gs u r et ob es e l e c t e di fm3 = a. Hence the only possibility to receive db1 > 1
4 for
player b1 is if the apex player is never selected until the end. But the apex player
is chosen last only with probability 3
70; hence the expected payoﬀ share for b1 if
she demands db1 > 1
4 is 3
70db1 ≤ 3
70. By demanding db1 = 1
4, on the other hand, b1
can guarantee herself 1
4 with probability 1
2, i.e., with the probability that m2 = a:
in fact, if m2 = a the apex strictly prefers to close, since if she does not close the
subsequent movers might choose the MWC of all base players, since they would be
indiﬀerent. This 1
8 expected share (plus 1
4
3
70 if a is last) dominates asking more than
1
4. QED.
428 Appendix: Field Regressions Using the Apex1/3 Data
Baron-Ferejohn Games Demand Bargaining Games
Speci￿cation 1 Inexp. Exp. Inexp. Exp.
Share of Votes 1.01*** 1.00*** 0.99*** 1.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
R2 0.97 0.87 0.93 0.95
Speci￿cation 2
Share of Votes 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.94*** 0.98***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Form.*Share of Votes 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.10**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
R2 0.97 0.98 0.93 0.95
No. Obs. 379 179 298 142
** Signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level
*** Signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level
Table 13: Estimates of Payoﬀ Shares as a Function of Vote Share in Winning Coali-
tion (standard errors in parentheses)
43Baron-Ferejohn Games Demand Bargaining Games
Inexp. Exp. Inexp Exp
Constant -0.02 -0.03** -0.08*** -0.10***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
Voting Weight 1.50*** 1.60*** 1.78*** 1.97***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.15)
Formateur 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
R2 0.76 0.83 0.68 0.76
No. Obs. 379 179 298 142
** Signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level
*** Signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level
Table 14: Estimates of Payoﬀ Shares as a Function of Voting - Weight Shares
(clustered standard errors in parentheses)
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